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RAPID RESPONSE PNEUMATIC FIRE DETECTION FOR 
MULTILEVEL METAL MINES: SYSTEM DESIGN 
AND IN-MINE TESTING 
By W. H. Pomroy,l R. E. Griffin,2 and M. A. Ackerson2 
ABSTRACT 
This report describes research by the U.S . Bureau of Mines to design and in-mine test a rapid 
response pneumatic fire detection system for multilevel metal mines . The relative merits of pneumatic 
detection are discussed in the context of typical multilevel mine layouts and environments. The Bureau's 
prototype system is described, with emphasis on design features that counter commonly experienced 
and/or perceived operating problems with pneumatic detection systems. Finally, the results of a 3-year 
in-mine performance evaluation of the prototype system are discussed. 
lC;roup supervisor. 
2r: lectronics engineer. 
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INTRODUCTION 
U nderground mine fires are a serious hazard to life 
and property. During the 22-year period 1965-86, 
ZOO fires in underground metal and nonmetal mines were 
reported to Federal mine safety authorities in the United 
States (1-2).3 These fires accounted for 120 fatalities (3). 
It is estimated that over 650 additional fires occurred that 
were nonreportable (lasting less than 30 min and causing 
no injuries) (3) . Countless millions of dollars were spent 
on rescue and recovery efforts, equipment repair and 
replacement, and mine rehabilitation. In addition, mines 
idled by fires were forced to fo rego hundreds of millions 
of tons of mineral production. 
Contaminated air is the primary life safety hazard in an 
underground fire, accounting for about three-fourths of all 
underground noncoal mine fire deaths since 1945 (4). Air 
becomes contaminated because mine ventilation systems, 
which are designed to supply fresh air to the workings, 
distribute smoke and toxic fire gases with equal efficiency. 
Since contaminated air is spread so quickly, it is essential 
that the mine's emergency plan be initiated as soon as 
possible after a fire starts. Since 1950, 73 pct of all fires 
detected within 15 min have resulted in slight or no dam-
age to the mine (3). However, the elapsed time between 
ignition and activation of the emergency plan is often 
excessive. Since 1968, only about 40 pct of fires have been 
detected within 15 min of ignition, and most of those were 
fires on attended equipment or minor welding fires (3). 
Effective, reliable fire detection systems, capable of 
continuously monitoring mine air and sensing fires in their 
early or even incipient stages, can significantly improve 
mine safety by ensuring adequate time for mine personnel 
to initiate and follow appropriate emergency procedures. 
Two basic fire detection system configurations have 
been used successfully in underground mines: the pneu-
matic "tube bundle" approach and the fully electronic 
telemetry approach. Pneumatic detection involves sam-
pling the mine atmosphere through a network of plastic 
tubes, which terminate at a central analytic station 
equipped for gas monitoring. The electronic telemetry 
approach involves the placement of detection devices at 
each underground location to be monitored. Detector 
outputs are transmitted to a central control point over 
electronic telemetry lines. Such systems may consist of any 
number of detection devices, with One or more detectors 
installed at each monitoring point. 
Although pneumatic detection systems have been used 
in above-ground occupancies for many years (factories, 
ocean vessels, parking garages, etc.), their use in under-
ground mines is fairly recent. Practical, mine-worthy 
pneumatic detection systems were developed about 
20 years ago in the United Kingdom for the detection of 
slowly developing spontaneous combustion fires in coal 
mines (5). Early successes led to a proliferation of systems 
in the mid- to late 1970's, both in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere (6-10). Despite the advent of sophisticated digi-
tal systems for mine production and environment moni-
toring and control, pneumatic fire detection is stili re-
lied upon in about two-thirds of United Kingdom coal 
mines (11). However, its use was, and continues to be, 
limited to detection of slowly developing spontaneous 
combustion in coal mines. 
Table 1 summarizes some advantages and disadvantages 
of each approach. Although the pneumatic system pos-
sesses many positive features and was the subject of con-
siderable research effort in the late 1970's (12-15), it was 
never widely accepted in North American coal mines, or in 
noncoal mines anywhere. With specific respect to noncoal 
mines, the pneumatic system would appear to offer 
significant cost, performance, and reliability advantages 
over electronic telemetry systems. Although no specific 
rationale for the lack of acceptance has been documented, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that pervasive, yet mistaken 
notions regarding performance limitations, particularly 
system response time and overall reliability, are the 
principal reasons. These mistaken notions are artifacts of 
early system designs that, as a result of subsequent 
research and testing, have largely been corrected. 
In 1983, as part of its health and safety program, the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines initiated research to design and 
in-mine test a rapid response pneumatic fire detection 
system tailored to the unique requirements of multilevel 
metal mines. The objective of the program was to assess 
the overall technologic and economic feasibility of utilizing ' 
the pneumatic approach to provide mine-wide fire detec-
tion coverage in a typically configured multilevel metal 
mine. This report discusses the design of a pneumatic de-
tection system for multilevel metal mines and the results 
of a 3-year in-mine performance evaluation of the 
prototype system. 
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Table 1.-Comparlson of fire detection systems using pneumatic tube bundle and electronic telemetry 
Maintenance .. . ........ . 
Area of coverage .............. . 
Cost ....... .. ......... ..... . . 
Measurement precision and 
reliability. 
Need for electric power ......... . 
Products of combustion that can be 
detected. 
Environmental exposure factors .... 
Pneumatic tube bu'ndle 
Access is simple for analyzers, pumps, 
controls, etc. because all electronics and 
mechanical components can be located 
on surface. Plugs or breaks in sample 
tubes can be difficult to ioeate and 
repair. 
In large, spreadout mines, the time 
required for a sample to travel the entire 
length of a sample tube can be a 
limiting factor; e.g., a 3/B-in sample 
tube 10,000 It in length will result in a 
tube travel time of about 17 min. 
In general, the larger the system (i.e ., 
number of sampling points), the lower 
the cost per sampling point because 
only 1 analytic station is required . Like· 
wise, however, small systems have are· 
latively high cost per sample point. 
Because the analytic station can be on 
surface in a relatively clean 
environment, high·precision detection 
instruments can be utilized. Also, in 
that location, detector maintenance and 
calibration are likely to be frequent. 
Since all electronic equipment can be on 
surface, electric powzr is nc: required 
at each sampling point-a definite 
advantage if underground power is lost 
during a mine emergency. 
Most gases, including O2, CO, and COz, 
can be accurately measured. Smoke 
particles tend to diffuse into the tube; 
thus, depending on tube length, dia· 
meter, sample air velocity, and other 
factors, smoke detection mayor may 
not be possible for a given application. 
Some gases, such as NO. and SOl' 
react with the tube or the water that 
may collect in the tube, producing 
erroneous readings. Measurements of 
air velocity, direction, and temperature 
at the sampling point are impossible. 
Analytic station can be located in a clean 
environment. Tubes are subject to 
plugging from dust accumulation and 
condensation of humid sample air. 
Freezing conditions further exacerbate 
humidity and condensation problems. 
Broken lines may result from abrasion, 
cuts, roof falls, atc. 
Electronic telemetry 
Access to some underground locations 
for maintenance, calibration and/or 
repair of equipment can be a problem. 
Troubleshooting telemetry lines (opens, 
faults, etc.) is generally easier than 
troubleshooting sample tubes (plugs or 
breaks). 
Very long transmission distances (5 to 
15 miles) may require special telemetry 
provision. 
Since each sampling point requires full 
complement of detection instruments, 
system costs increase in proportion to 
the number of samplin~ points. Tele· 
metry line acquisition and installation 
costs are generally lower than for tube 
bundles servicing the same number of 
sampling points, especially if multiplex 
data transmission is employed. 
Measurement precision and reliability are 
directly proportional to the adequacy of 
detector maintenance and calibration . 
Where flccessibility is difficult, mea· 
surement precision and reliability may 
be low. 
In general, electric power is required at 
3ach sampling point; however, some 
detectors can be powered through the 
telemetry lines (i.e., from surface). 
Any gas, particulate, or condition (air 
velocity, direction, temperature, etc.) for 
which a detection instrument exists can 
be measured . 
Ruggedness and resistance to harsh 
environmental effects (heat, humidity, 
cold , dust, diesel exhaust, blast fumes, 
etc.) are essential for detection in· 
struments. Both detection instruments 
and telemetry lines may be affected by 
electromagnetic Interference from near· 
by power lines and other !';ources. 
Broken telemetry lines may result from 
roof falls, etc.; however, redundant 
telemetry lines, telemetry loop con· 
figurations, etc., can be employed to 
improve telemetry reliability. Input 
voltage fluctuations and electrical tran· 
sients (voltage spikes) can also be 
expected underground. 
SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA 
The prototype pneumatic detection system was designed 
to satisfy five primary design criteria addressing reliability, 
maintainability, system response time, measurement sensi-
tivity and accuracy, and cost. These criteria are discussed 
in the following sections. 
RELIABILITY 
Fire detection system reliability is critical. Unwarranted 
alarms (false positives) tend to undercut confidence in the 
system to the extent that alarms resulting from actual fires 
may not be acted upon. Equally undesirable are missed 
alarms (false negatives) wherein the system fails to detect 
a fire. Reliability is the probability that a system will 
perform a stated function under specified conditions. The 
reliability of a system is the product of the reliability of 
each component making up the system. Thus, system re-
liability is maximized when the reliability of individual 
components is maximized and when the number of indivi-
dual components is minimized. The conditions of envi-
ronmental exposure under which the system must function 
are also of material significance to reliability. The mine 
environment is characterized by high humidity, a large 
range of ambient temperatures, dust, diesel exhaust, 
blasting fumes, and physical abuse from equipment 
muvement and falls of ground. Each of these conditions 
must be considered and negated in the design of the 
system. 
A very high level of monitoring system reliability is 
possible with pneumatic detection. Since all electrical 
components are centralized, they are generally enclosed 
in a separate housing or room provided for that purpose, 
offering a degree of protection from the harsh mine 
environment. Where the central analysis station is on 
surface, all electrical equipment is removed entirely from 
the dust, dampness, and temperature variations that are 
often the cause of breakdowns in totally electronic moni-
toring systems. 
Since considerable discretion can be exercised in speci-
fying the location for the central analytic station, manage-
ment considerations such as accessibility are usually the 
primary factors in determining its location. And as is often 
the case at underground mines, equipment and facilities 
that are accessible receive proper inspection and main-
tenance, while those that are not easily accessible do not. 
Finally, it should be noted that pneumatic detection 
systems can incorporate the same types of system failure 
alarms as fully electronic systems. Analogous to 
an electronic systems' fault detection circuits, which sense 
for broken or shorted telemetry lines, pneumatic detection 
systems can be provided with sensors that report broken or 
plugged sample tubes or other fault conditions. 
MAINTAINABILITY 
The reliability of a system is often determined by the 
adequacy of the maintenance it receives. The level of sys-
tem maintenance received is, in turn, influenced by the na-
ture and frequency of maintenance required and by the 
difficulties encountered in rendering maintenance service. 
As a result, the system must incorporate design features 
that minimize the frequency and complexity of mainten-
ance, such as isolation from the harsh mine enviroment, 
built-in troubleshooting aids, self-diagnostics, anci auto-
matic calibration and parameter adjustment. In addition, 
key system components must be readily accessible to facili-
tate necessary maintenance interventions. Weekly visual 
checks of the control room, a 30-min functional check of 
the control system every 90 days, and a 2-h preventive 
maintenance routine annually were established as main-
tenance design goals. 
SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 
As noted above, nearly three-fourths of fires detected 
within 15 min produced only slight or no damage to the 
mine. Hence, the system response time design goal was 
established as 15 min. Note that this design goal refers to 
the time required to issue an alarm once the system has 
encountered contaminated air. The elapsed time from 
igniti-on until the mine's ventilation has carried the com-
bustion products to the system are not included. However, 
careful layout of the system to achieve maximum mine 
coverage will minimize these delays. 
MEASUREMENT SENSITIVITY AND ACCURACY 
Accurate data regarding the presence and concentration 
of combustion products at key underground locations are 
essential. Even slight excursions from ambient levels of. 
the target gases could portend a significant fire event. 
Thus, the detection instruments must be capable of reli-
ably responding to the earliest precursor of fire. Goals for 
sensitivity and accuracy were established at 1 ppm for CO 
and 10 ppm for CO2• These levels are appropriate to pro-
vide sufficient advance warning of a fire event for initiation 
of effective emergency operations. 
COST 
Since total system costs (hardware acquisition, installa-
tion, and long-term maintenance) are application specific, 
a design goal relating to an absolute cost figure for a sys-
tem was not possible. However, as pneumatic detection 
applied to multilevel metal mines is essentially a new 
technology, it is appropriate to index system costs relative 
to the status quo technology, namely, electronic telemetry. 
Therefore, the design goal for total cost of the pneumatic 
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detection system was established as a level equal to or less 
than the cost of an electronic telemetry system witl-: 
roughly equivalent detection capabilities. 
DESCRIPTION OF PROTOTYPE PNEUMATIC DETECTION SYSTEM 
The prototype pneumatic detection system consisted of 
three primary subsystems: air sampling, gas analysis, and 
system control. Each subsystem is described in the fol-
lowing sections. Where appropriate, aspects of the system 
that satisfy a particular system design criterion are 
highlighted. 
AIR-SAMPLING SUBSYSTEM 
The air-sampling subsystem is required to draw samples 
of the mine atmosphere from various underground loca-
tions through plastic tubes to an analytic station where the 
presence and level of combustion gases can be determined. 
Vacuum pumps were provided in the analytic station for 
this purpose. All electrical and mechanical equipment 
would thus be centralized for ease of maintenance and 
removed from the harsh underground environment for 
improved performance. Polyethylene tubing was selected 
for its durability, flexibility, light weight, and low cost. A 
main bundle, consisting of the sample tubes surrounded by 
1/2 in of thermal insulation and a tough outer neoprene 
jacket, was installed in the shaft, with individual tubes 
branching off on various levels to specific monitoring 
locations. 
Tube and pump sizing is based on previous empirical 
studies by the Bureau (16). Because of limits on effective 
pumping, the relationship of tube length to tube diameter 
is as follows: 
where 0 
T ~ 0 ~ 0.02 L1/ 3 
4.78 x 10-3 xL' 
tube IO, in, 
L maximum tube length, ft (maximum length 
and T 
at test site is 4,000 ft), 
transit time, min (design goal for system 
response time is 15 min) . 
Solving for 0 produces the following: 
0.78 ~ 0 ~ 0.34. 
The smallest standard tube size that falls within this in-
terval, 3/8 in (0.375 in), was selected for the prototype 
system. A wall thickness of 1/16 in was found to be 
sufficiently damage resistant, resulting in a tube 00 of 
1/2 in. 
Since the cumulative effect of the flow restriction 
offered by the tube connectors could be quite large, 
connectors with the largest possible IO were used 
(0.3125 in). The connectors selected for the prototype sys-
tem were brass compression-type fittings utilizing a re-
placeable nylon compression sleeve. 
Water traps are required to prevent the accumulation 
of water in the sample lines, which could seriously impair 
sample flows. The accumulation of water would be 
particularly acute where warm, moist mine air is drawn 
through sample tubes that are routed in intake air near a 
mine opening or other area where the air temperature is 
below the dewpoint of the sample. Accumulated water 
could also freeze, further compounding the problem. 
Standard water traps were modified for this system 
using a specially designed two-way check valve assembly. 
During normal operation (i.e., under vacuum), a vacuum 
check valv:: prevented air leakage into the water trap and, 
hence, dilution of the sample. To empty the traps, the 
system was periodically cycled into a pressure mode, 
wherein the entire tubing network was pressurized with 
compressed air. The water traps were equipped with float-
type check valves that permitted accumulated water to be 
blown out by the compressed air pressure but then sealed 
again:;t further pressure loss once the trap was empty 
(fig. 1). Laboratory testing of the modified water traps 
was performed prior to in-mine installation to ensure pro-
per, maintenance-free operation. 
Two vacuum pumps are required for system opera-
tion: a purge pump and a sample pump. The purge pump 
maintains a constant flow in the lines, exhausting to the 
atmosphere. The sample pump draws air samples from 
each line in sequence, exhausting to the detection instru-
ments. Pumping requirements are defined by the tube di-
mensions, the number of tubes, and the desired tube tran-
sit time. Since flow-regulating valves were provided, each 
line's flow characteristic was nearly identical and roughly 
equivalent to that of the longest line (i.e., 4,000 ft). Thus, 
the pump requirements and tube dimensions are related as 
follows (16): 
for the purge pump 
D2 
Q = 7r x 576T x (n - 1) xL, 
for the sample pump ... 
where 
and 
0 2 Q =7rx--xL 
576T ' 
n = number of tubes, 
Q volumetric flow, dm. 
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Incoming water-laden air Outgoing dry air 
; :: ,: .. : : 
';:":. ':'.' . 
Figure 1.-Water trap 
// -Seat for pre ssure 
check volve 
---Flexible flap-type 
vacuum check valve 
These formulas produce design values of 2.25 cfm for 
the purge pump and 0.20 cfm for the sample pump. The 
pumps must be capable of providing these flows at a speci-
fic vacuum. The vacuum required to produce the desired 
sample transit time is expressed as follows: 
where 
L2 
P = P(A) - P(P) = 2.37 X 10-8 x -2- , 
DT 
P pressure drop over the lines, atm, 
P(A) ambient pressure at inlet to tube 
(assume 1 atm), 
and p(p) = pressure at pump inlet, atm. 
This formula produces an operating vacuum value of 
0.18 atm. The pumps selected for the prototype system 
were rated at a vacuum of 0.25 atm and flows of 7.25 cfm 
and 1.75 cfm for the purge and sample pumps, respec-
tively. Pump capacity in excess of design requirements was 
provided to compensate for otherwise unaccounted-for 
losses (tube connectors, water trap check valves, line 
leakage, etc.) and to allow for possible future expansion of 
the system (additional tubes, longer tubes, etc.). 
Three-way, solenoid-operated valves having low flow 
resIstance were installed in each line. The valves were 
sequentially cycled by the system control to direct sample 
gas from one line at a time to the sample pump and gas 
analyzers while the flow from the remaining 11 lines pass-
ed through the purge pump and was exhausted. 
GAS ANALYSIS SUBSYSTEM 
There exist four standard classifications of fire detec-
tors (17): 
1. Heat detectors respond to abnormally high temper-
atures or rates of temperature rise; 
2. Flame detectors respond to the infrared, ultraviolet, 
or visible radiation produced by a fire; 
3. Smoke detectors respond to the visible or invisible 
particles of combustion; and 
4. Fire-gas detectors respond to the gases produced by 
a fITe. 
Heat and flame detectors are not practical for mine-
wide fire detection coverage, as they must be physically 
close to (or in the case of flame detectors, within line-of-
sight ot) the point of origin of the fire. Smoke detection 
provides a means for early detection of incipient fire; 
however, smoke detection adds an additional constraint on 
the design of a pneumatic detection system. Smoke parti-
cles tend to diffuse into the walls of the tubes, resulting in 
the potential for grossly erroneous smoke measurements. 
Previous research has developed tube diameter-to-length 
rati.o cr iteria for effective pneumatic smoke detection (16). 
For a tube length of 4,000 ft, however, tube diameters 
approaching 1 in would be required. 
Typical mine combustibles such as wood, rubber, brat-
tice, electrical insulation, etc., produce a variety of fire 
gases including CO, CO2, NO. (nitrogen oxides), HCN 
(hydrogen cyanide), NH3 (ammonia), and many others. 
CO and CO2 are produced in varying but sufficient 
quantities to be reliably detected. Although CO is not the 
most toxic of the fire gases, it is always one of the most 
abundant and, therefore, is considered the principal life -
safety threat in most fire atmospheres. CO is produced 
during the earliest stages of combustion and is an excel-
lent early indicator of fire. It is also produced in large 
quantities in confined or smoldering fires, as is often the 
case underground. CO2 is a product of complete com-
bustion of carbonaceous material and is generally pro-
duced in large quantities during flaming combustion. It 
was determined that both CO and CO2 detection should be 
incorporated into the prototype detection system. As 
noted above, although both gases are formed in most fires, 
one or the other gas would likely predominate, depending 
on the type of fire. Thus, analysis of the ratio of the two 
gases, along with other data such as the known combus-
tibles in the vicinity of the fire and the ventilation through 
the fire zone, would enable a characterization of any fire 
that might occur. A system incorporating two detectors 
would also be inherently more reliable than one 
utilizing a single detector, as the two detectors would 
provide a degree of redundancy. 
A wide variety of CO and CO2 detection instruments 
suitable for fire detection purposes are commercially 
available. Detectors based on the operating principle of 
nondispersive infrared (NDIR) absorption were selected 
foe the prototype pneumatic detection system. Radiation 
from an infrared source is passed through a cell containing 
the sample of gas to be analyzed and is absorbed by the 
gas present. A filtered infrared detector responds to this 
change in radiation, and its output is compared with a 
reference cell, conditioned by suitable electronics, and read 
out on an appropriately marked meter. A stable reading 
is generally obtained in 2 to 5 s, followed by a rezero in 3 
to 4 s. 
NDIR detectors are quick and accurate, and sensitivity 
to 1 pct of full scale can be achieved. For CO, a detection 
range of 0 to 100 ppm is utilized, with the resulting 
sensitivity being 1 ppm (2 pct of the 50-ppm threshold 
limit value (TLV)). For CO2, a detection range of 0 to 
1,000 ppm is utilized, with the resulting sensitivity being 
10 ppm (0.2 pct of the 5,000-ppm TLV). Until recently, 
NDIR detectors were confined to laboratory use only, as 
they were too delicate to withstand even moderate 
temperature and humidity variations. The models selected 
for this system are more robust and are designed for 
limited field exposures. 
SYSTEM CONTROL 
The detection system is controlled by a 64-Kb random 
access memory (RAM) microcomputer and associated 
hardware. Included are a single 5-1/4-in 110ppy disk drive, 
a monitor, a printer, and several expansion cards that 
perform specific control functions. The computer operates 
in a process control mode to monitor the operational 
status of the various detection system components (pumps, 
analyzers, etc.), cycle the solenoid valves in the proper 
time sequence, initiate gas analYLer calibration and water 
trap blowout routines, and issue alarm and trouble 
warnings. The computer also stores system data and 
provides the user with several menu-selectable video dis-
play, system output, and system control options. 
The system's operating program is stored on a single 
Ooppy diskette. The program is automatically loaded into 
the computer's memory upon power-up, eliminating the 
need to manually reboot the system after a power outage. 
The disk is also used to store system output data covering 
a 48-h period. These data include tube number, date, 
time, CO2 and CO levels, and vacuum pressure. These 
values are updated in memory every 6 min and stored on 
the disk every hour. An on-board modem allows a remote 
terminal to access the system and automatically transfer 
data stored on the disk. A larger capacity memory storage 
device such as a hard disk would permit data from longer 
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time periods to be stored. Depending on the size, several 
months' storage capacity would be possible. 
The computer controls the solenoid valves, alarms, and 
related devices through a 32-channel, optically isolated 
power interface. This interface provides the capability to 
switch both ac and dc voltages while completely isolating 
these voltages from the computer. When a solenoid is 
activated, airOow from that tube is diverted into the gas 
analyzers. After allowing the outputs from the analyzers 
to stabilize for 10 s, the computer records the gas concen-
tration values, purges the analyzers with atmospheric air 
for 5 s, and cycles to the next tube. 
Three minutes are thus required to cycle through all 
12 tubes. To ensure accuracy in measuring gas concentra-
tions, the system also controls a pair of automatic gas ana-
lyzer calibrators. When activated by the computer, these 
calibrators automatically standardize the gas analyzers us-
ing calibration gases contajned in high-pressure gas storage 
cylinders. 
A 16-channel, 12-bit precision data acquisition system 
enables the computer to monitor the analog output volt-
ages of the gas analyzers and pressure transducers. This 
data acquisition system converts the 0- to 5-V outputs into 
digital form, which can be processed by the computer. 
When the CO2 and/or CO gas concentrations exceed a 
preset limit, the system issues audible and vjsual warnings 
indicating a possible fire condition. High or low vacuum 
(indicating plugged or broken sample tubes, respectively), 
and low compressed air pressure are also monitored, with 
trouble alarms provided to warn of system failures. 
Under normal operating conditions, the system will cy-
cle through each tube in sequence while the video monjtor 
displays a menu of user-selectable options. One option is 
a system status display showing the date and time followed 
by a table listing, by tube number, the current gas con-
centrations and vacuum readings. The user is also able 
to change the levels at which a high-gas-concentration 
alarm and/or a high- or low-vacuum alarm will be acti-
vated. A graph of gas concentrations versus time can be 
generated, as well as a table of mjnimum, maximum, and 
average gas concentrations for periods of up to 48 h. Pa-
per printouts of these data displays can also be selected. 
Finally, manual override control of the gas analyzer cali-
bration and water trap blowout functions is provided. 
\Vhenever an alarm or trouble condition is detected by 
the system, an audible alarm is sounded, the system status 
display appears on the video screen, and a hard-copy mes-
sage indicating the date, time, cause of alarm, and location 
is printed. The audible alarm continues until it is either 
acknowledged or until the condition giving rise to the 
alarm returns to its normal state. In the latter case, a 
second hard-copy message clearing the alarm is printed. 
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Figure 2.-Schematic of major components of pneumatic fire detection system. 
IN-MINE TEST 
The prototype pneumatic detection system was installed 
and functionally tested at a multilevel underground zinc 
mine in Ogdensburg, NJ. The following sections describe 
the test site, the installation of prototype equipment, 
overall system performance during the 3-year test period, 
and system maintenance and reliability. 
DESCRIPTION OF TEST SITE 
Because of adverse economic conditions, the mine used 
for in-mine testing was permanently closed shortly after 
the in-mine tests were completed. Prior to the shutdown, 
zinc ore was mined by the overhand cut-and-fill method. 
Backfill was placed hydraulically after each cut. The host 
rock is calcite and marble, and the predominant ore min-
erals are the zinc silicates zincite, willemite, and 
franklinite. Both stopes and pillars were mined. Diesel 
load-haul-dump units were used in most stopes, and elec-
tric slushers were used in the narrower pillars. Ore was 
dumped into loading chutes leading to haulage levels 
where it was hauled by rail to a central ore pass system 
and crushed underground. At the time the prototype de-
tection system was installed, the mine produced about 
350 st of ore per day. Primary access to the mine was 
through a five-compartment main shaft inclined 52° from 
the horizontal to follow the dip of the ore body. Access 
was also possible through an emergency escape shaft (safe-
ly exit) . An old, unused production shaft also intersects 
several levels; however, the ladderway and sets in the old 
shaft had deteriorated to the point that use as an escape-
way was not possible. 
The mine had 20 active levels, which included an ad it to 
a surface portal, 18 mining levels, and a crusher below the 
1,850-ft level, the deepest mining level. The shaft reached 
a maximum depth of 2,165 ft, while the shaft itself, because 
of the 52° angle of inclination, was 2,741 ft long. A winze 
approximately 1,100 ft north of the main shaft provided 
access from the 1,850-ft level to seven lower levels in the 
so-called north are body. The north ore body was com-
pletely mined out and the workings are flooded to within 
about 25 ft of the 1,850-ft level. 
The main fan was located on the 1,750-ft level. Air was 
downcast through the safety exit, across the 1,750-ft level, 
and down a raise to the 1,850-ft level, then coursed up the 
ore chutes, raises, stapes, and pillars, and finally exhausted 
through the main shaft. 
INSTALLATION OF PROTOTYPE EQUIPMENT 
The prototype detection system monitored 18 locations 
through 12 tubes. The system monitored the main shaft, 
two pumping stations, two crusher stations, the north ore 
body winze and hoist room, an abandoned research seis-
mograph laboratory, a transformer station, and the exhaust 
air from nine stopes. Ten tubes monitored single lo-
cations, one tube monitored the north ore body winze and 
hoist room as well as the seismograph laboratory, and the 
final tube monitored five of the stopes. 
The vacuum pumps, gas analyzers, and all system con-
trol equipment were installed in a small room in the adit-
level shaft station (fig. 3). The room, which had previously 
been used to store safety equipment, was about 1/4 mile 
[rom the mine office and could be accessed on foot 
without need for shaft or other conveyance. Certain mini-
mal precautions were taken to seal openings in the room 
against the entrance of moisture, which could affect elec-
trical equipment. The bottom, which was concrete, was 
scaled with roofing tar, and a new plywood floor was 
instaiJed. The walls, which were welded steel plate, were 
sealed where they met the irregular rock surface with 
aerosol foam filler-sealer. The same foam was used to 
seal cracks in the corrugated steel roof. Finally, a 
foam-rubber gasket was installed on the steel plate door . 
Although the room was far from airtight, it was thought 
that the heat generated by the pumps, computer, and gas 
analyzers would be sufficient to maintain a relatively low 
humidity level within. 
Routing of the main bundle was based on consideration 
for certain mine environmental exposures that could affect 
system performance. Since a hydraulic fill line with a 
history of breakage was located in the main shaft from the 
430-ft level to the 1,850-ft level, it was decided to route the 
main bundle in the safety exit through these levels. How-
ever, the safety exit was an intake airway, and the 
temperature through its top few levels could fall below 
freezing during the winter months. Therefore, it was 
decided that the main bundle should travel from the con-
trol room in the adit, down the main shaft to the 43O-ft 
level, across the 43O-ft level to the safety exit, and down 
the safety exit to the 1,850-ft level. This routing added 
about 700 ft to the length of the bundle, but eliminated the 
potential for a broken fill line to sever the tubes and for 
cold temperatures to cause condensed water to freeze and 
plug the lines. A cross section of the mine depicting the 
layout of the main bundle is shown if! figure 4. 
A total of 39,900 ft of tubing was used in the prototype 
system. About 80 pct of the total was contained in the 
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main bundle, and the remaining 20 pct were single tubes 
that branched off on various levels and led to specific 
monitoring locations. Tubes contained within the main 
bundle were color coded and numbered to facilitate instal-
lation and subsequent system layout changes. The tube 
bundle manufacturer's maximum bundle size was 10 tubes; 
thus, two 6-tube bundles were used in the upper levels of 
the mine where 12 tubes were required. From the 5OO-ft 
level to the I,OOO-ft level, a single lO-tube bundle was used. 
From the I,OOO-ft level to the 1,500-ft level, an 8-tube 
bundle was used, and finally, from the 1,500-ft level to the 
1,850-ft level, a single 6-tube bundle was used. 
In order to ensure that all work would be completed on 
schedule, it was necessary to order the main bundle before 
it was known precisely what facilities, personnel, and 
equipment would be available to accomplish the installa-
tion. As a result, the bundle was supplied in 50-ft seg-
ments that could easily be handled by one person without 
special equipment. The disadvantage of working with 50-ft 
segments, however, is the number of splices necessary. 
Each splice required about 15 min to complete (fig. 5), 
caused a slight flow restriction, and represented a potential 
source of leakage and/or tubing separation. In retrospect, 
the preferred alternative would clearly have been to ensure 
that proper equipment and facilities be available to lower 
the tube bundle from the shaft collar in one continuous 
length. An acceptable compromise would be segments of 
200 to 250 ft. 
Regarding the tubing itself, it was found that quality 
control during manufacture is extremely important to 
enable an effective and efficient installation. The diameter 
of some of the tubing supplied in the bundle was found to 
be slightly oversized, while other segments were slightly 
undersized. It was difficult to slide the nylon compression 
sleeve onto the oversized tubing. In many cases, it was 
necessary to shave the ends of the tubes with a razor knife 
to get the sleeve on, increasing the time required to make 
a connection and weakening the tube somewhat. With 
undersized tubing, it was difficult to tighten the compres-
sion fittings sufficiently to achieve a strong connection, 
producing a potential tubing separation at some point in 
the future . 
The entire detection system was instaJled by a four-
person crew over an S-week period. Installation of the 
tubing network required 5 weeks. installation of the 
bundle generally involved connecting two to four segments, 
then attaching the bundle to available mounting points 
in the shaft or drift. The preferred mounting points were 
the pins to which water or air lines had been secured. 
Wherever possible, attachment to the water or air lines 
themselves was avoided, as these lines were occasionally 
removed . The pins, however, were permanent. Where 
there were no water or air lines, the bundle was attached 
to pitons driven into crevices in the drift or shaft walls. In 
all cases, care was taken to install the bundle so that it 
would not be subject to damage from passing equipment. 
On the 430 level, where the bundle ran 700 ft from the 
main shaft to the safety exit, drifts occasionally narrowed 
to the point where the bundle, if hung from pins, could not 
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Figure 3.-Control room for pneumatic fire detection system. 
Figure 4.-Mlne cross section showing layout of main tube 
bundle. 
Figure 5.- Spllclng main tube bundle during Installation of 
pneumatic fire detection system. 
Figure 6.-Routlng of main bundles through pipe In narrow drifts. 
be prevented from becoming entangled with passing equip-
ment. In those areas, pipes were mounted flush with 
the drift walls and the bundle was run through the pipes 
(fig. 6). 
The same general practices were employed in installing 
the individual tubes that branched from the main bundle 
and led to specific monitoring locations. At the moni-
toring locations themselves, care was taken to install the 
tube near the roof, where, because of heat-induced buoy-
ant forces, the concentration of combustion products would 
be highest. 
No unusual problems were encountered during installa-
tion of the pumps, control valves, analyzers, computer, and 
related equipment in the system control room. Noise from 
the pumps was a bit bothersome, but earplugs provided 
adequate relief. The various components, including a mine 
telephone, were arranged so as to be within easy reach of 
one person. 
Once all hardware was installed, an initial checkout of 
the system was performed. Of particular concern was the 
continuity and integrity of the sample lines. A vacuum 
gauge was attached to the monitoring-point end of each 
sample line and the line evacuated. Then a valve in the 
control room was closed to seal and isolate the line from 
the rest of the system. The rate of vacuum decay, as mea-
sured by the vacuum gauge, was used as an indication of 
the extent of leaks in the line. The same procedure was 
followed using compressed air instead of vacuum, as the 
system would be operated under both pressure and vacu-
um, and leakage under one condition might not be appar-
ent during tests under the other condition. These tests 
represented considerably more severe conditions than 
would exist under normal operations, because with the 
monitoring-point end of the line sealed, the maximum 
vacuum or pressure is much higher than would be the case 
if the line were open at the end. Several leaks were dis 
covered and repaired, followed by retesting. All lines were 
found to be sound, with both vacuum and pressure decay 
times ranging from 2 to 5 min. 
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
Overall performance was found to be satisfactory, in 
that the system demonstrated the capability to monitor and 
record CO and COz concentrations at the desired under-
ground locations and warn mine personnel when levels of 
these gases exceeded specified thresholds. The system did 
not operate continuously throughout the evaluation period. 
Operation was interrupted from time to time to conduct 
experiments, and certain equipment modifications were 
implemented in a continuing attempt to improve perform-
ance. Equipment malfunctions were rare, being limited to 
initial pump and valve problems, which were easily 
corrected (corrective action described in the next section). 
System operation was closely monitored throughout the 
3-year evaluation period. No fires were detected by the 
system, and aside from late afternoon excursions in both 
the CO and COz levels corresponding to end-of-shift 
blasting operations (fig. 7), no alarms occurred during the 
evaluation. A background level of 1 to 3 ppm CO was 
observed, probably due to diesel operations; however, no 
adjustment to the CO alarm level was made. 
Quantitative testing was performed during periodic 
visits to the mine by Bureau personnel. Specific quanti-
tative system performance is described below, based on a 
series of functional tests conducted at the conclusion of the 
3-year in-mine evaluation period. Two parameters were 
measured during these tests: tube travel time (the time re-
quired for a volume of calibration gas to travel the entire 
length of a tube and register on the analyzer) and dilution. 
Travel time and dilution testing involved connection of a 
large plastic bag filled with calibration gas to the 
monitoring-point end of a tube. The connection included 
a flowmeter to measure the rate at which the calibration 
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Figure 7.-Elevated CO and C02 1eveia following end.of-shift blasting. 
Figure a.-Calibration ga.bag connected to sample tube. 
gas was drawn out of the bag by the system (fig. 8). For 
these tests, 93-ppm-CO calibration gas was used. A testing 
subroutine to automatically determine the travel time and 
maximum gas concentration registered by the analyzers 
was included in the computer program that operated the 
detection system. At a preset time, the sample tube was 
connected to the bag and the testing subroutine initiated. 
Five sample tubes were tested in this manner. The five 
tubes ranged from the shortest (except for the ad it 
sampling point) to the longest tube in the system. 
Multiple tests at varying flow rates were conducted on 
tubes 1, 2, and 10. 
For purposes of these tests, tube travel time was 
defined as the elapsed time from the release of test gas 
into a sampling point until the analyzer registered 10 ppm 
CO. The maximum concentration of gas registered by the 
analyzer was used as a measure of the dilution of the 
sample. Results of testing are shown in table 2. 
Predicted travel times for each tube were calculated 
based on known tube length and measured flow rate. Pre-
dicted travel times matched measured travel times quite 
well, with a linear correlation coefficient of 0.93. 
The 93-ppm calibration gas was diluted considerably 
during transit because of leaks in the sample tubes, with 
maximum gas concentrations at the analyzer registering 
from 46 to 76 ppm. However, as noted above, travel times 
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were not appreciably affected, meaning the detection sys-
tem was capable of providing a timely warning despite the 
leakage. 
Table 2.- Summary of results of travel time and dilution tests 
Tube Length, Flow, Travel time, Max gas 
ft cfm min cone, 
Predicted Measured ppm 
3,550 0.33 8.2 9.7 76 
.22 12.7 17.5 67 
2 3,775 .54 5.3 5.3 58 
.36 8.1 9.2 46 
.48 6.1 6.5 58 
3 4,775 .43 8 .6 8.6 76 
9 1,875 .31 4.7 6.2 58 
10 . . .. 560 .20 ~ .. : 3.7 54 
.42 1.0 1.8 75 
.22 1.8 3.3 61 
.32 1.3 2.0 66 
.25 1.6 2.8 58 
The provision for blowing water from the sample tubes 
proved to be quite effective. Inspection of the tubes 
shortly after the system was commissioned, but prior to the 
installation of the water traps, revealed accumulations of 
water at low points where the tubes sagged. Following in-
stallation of the traps (fig. 9), such accumulations were not 
completely eliminated; however, enough of the water was 
Figure 9.-Water trapa Inatalled In main tube bundle. 
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removed by the traps that system performance was not im-
paired by accumulated water. Purging the tubes with high-
pressure (80 psi) compressed air cleared both the traps 
and other water accumulations. 
MAINTENANCE AND RELIABILITY 
As a result of the design of the system and the installa-
tion precautions discussed earlier, system maintenance 
requirements were minimal. Mine personnel made a visu-
al check of the system about once a week, and calibration 
gas tanks required replacement every 3 months. At that 
time, the analyzers were manually calibrated and the vacu-
um pumps were checked for dirt and debris in their in-line 
filters. The pumps originally installed in the system were 
of the diaphragm type and exhibited a tendency toward 
overheating, a condition that effectively shut down the sys-
tem because of the pumps' thermal protection featurr-. 
The rotary-vane pumps that were subsequently installed 
eliminated the problem and proved to be less noisy as well. 
Difficulties were encountered with the three-way sole-
noid valves shortly after installation. The valves functioned 
properly in the sampling mode; however, the back pres-
sure produced during the water trap blowout mode ex-
ceeded the force limitation of the reset spring. Leakage 
through the valves prevented sufficient pressure from 
building in the tubes to effectively blowout accumulated 
water. These valves were subsequently replaced with ones 
having a higher back pressure rating, and no further prob-
lems were experienced. 
Reliability of the gas analyzers exceeded the pr.oject's 
design goals. After 6 months operation, the analyzers 
were removed and cleaned; however, no subsequent main-
tenance was performed or required. Autocalibrator reli-
ability also exceeded design goals; the only problem 
was a faulty control valve, which was discovered during 
installation. 
The computer control functioned continuously through-
out the test period without difficulty. A modem accessory, 
which was installed 2 years into the test period, was also 
highly reliable. Power outages at the minesite occurred 
occasionally; however, the self-booting feature of the 
control software functioned as designed, and the system 
automatically returned to a state of full operational readi-· 
ness when power was restored. 
Bureau personnel visited the mine about twice a year 
for routine inspections and to conduct various experiments. 
With each visit, problems with tubing integrity were dis-
covered. The most common problem was tubing that was 
disconnected at various points underground because of 
maintenance operations in the vicinity of the bundle 
or from stopes breaking through to haulage levels. In 
an active mine, such problems are to be expected, 
especially for experimental equipment, and the tubing was 
reconnected or rerouted, as necessary. In a few rare cases, 
breaks due to faulty connections were found and repaired. 
The problem of faulty connections can be minimized by 
using higher quality tubing and by employing longer tube 
bundle segments (or ideally, a continuous-length bundle) 
to reduce the number of connections required. 
SYSTEM COSTS 
Estimated total costs of the prototype pneumatic detec-
tion system, including hardware, software, and installation, 
are summarized in table 3. Similar costs for an elec-
tronic telemetry system with roughly equivalent detection 
capabilities are summarized in table 4. These estimated 
costs for the two systems are not significantly different. 
Total life-cycle costs, however, which include long-term 
inspection, maintenance, repair, and replacement of failed 
equipment, would likely favor the pneumatic system, as all 
mechanical and electrical equipment is located in a rela-
tively nonhostile environment and is easily accessible for 
inspection and maintenance. 
Table 3.-Estimated cost of prototype pneumatic detection 
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Analyzers ........ 2 3,400.00 
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VDT Video display terminal. RAM Random access memory. 
lCosts estimated in 1988 U.S. dollars. 
z1 CO, 1 COz' 
34 persons for 40 days. 
Table 4.-Estlmated cost of electronic telemetry 
fire detection system, Including hardware, 
software, and Installatloni 
Item Quantity Unit cost Cost 
Hardware: 
Electrochemical gas analyzers: 
CO .............. .. .... 12 $900.00 $10,800 
CO2 , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • 12 1,200.00 14,400 
Oata communication system, 
including 12 outstations, 
A-O converters, I-a modules, 
multiplexer, VOT, 64-Kb RAM 
microcomputer, drives, printer 15,000.00 15,000 
Telemetry line, 22 AWG, twisted 
pair with shield ........ ft .. 12,000 .30 3,600 
Miscellaneous othtlr ............ ......... .... 1,000 
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44,800 
Software ... ........................ ........ 10,000 
Installation .. ...... . ... . . . . . e) 175.00 21,000 
Grand total ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75,800 
A-O Analog-to-digital. AWG American wire gauge. 
1-0 Input-output. RAM Random access memory. 
VOT Video display terminal. 
iCosts estimated in 1988 U.S. dollars. 
24 persons for 30 days. 
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During the 3-year in-mine test, oper~.ting costs for the 
prototype pneumatic system were quite low. As noted in 
the section on maintenance and reliability, the originally 
installed diaphragm-type pumps were replaced with rotary-
vane pumps; however, they are expected to last for years. 
Routine replacement items included end-of-line dust filters 
(approximately $3.00 per line per year) and calibration gas 
(approximately $400.00 per year for the system). Inspec-
tion and maintenance should average less than 4 h per 
month. Although it is difficult to compare operating costs 
for pneumatic versus telemetered systems, the telemetered 
system would probably be more costly to operate. 
Maintaining the detectors, for example, would be more 
time consuming because they are scattered throughout the 
mine. Routine replacement items for a telemetered 
system could also be quite costly. For example, if electro-
chemical detectors are used, the electrochemical cells must 
be replaced in every detector each 6 to 18 months, at a 
cost of $50.00 to $150.00 r.ach. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Bureau initiated research in 1983 to investi-
gate pneumatic detection system applications in multilevel 
metal and nonmetal mines. A completely automated 
12-tube system, equipped for CO and CO2 detection and 
operated by a 64-Kb RAM microcomputer, was subse-
quently designed and installed in an underground zinc 
mine for a 3-year in-mine evaluation. 
Overall system performance was found to be 
satisfactory, in that the system demonstrated a capability 
to monitor and record CO and CO2 concentrations at the 
desired underground locations and warn mine personnel 
when levels of these gases exceeded specified threshold. 
The in-mine evaluation addressed specific system design 
criteria, including reliability, maintainability, system 
response time, measurement sensitivity and accuracy, and 
cost. Except for measurement accuracy, each criteria was 
satisfied or exceeded. With respect to measurement 
accuracy, sample tube leakage resulted in dilution of 
the air samples, producing erroneous gas concentration 
measurements at the analyzers. In one series of tests, 
93-ppm-CO calibration gas released into several sampling 
points registered from 46 to 76 ppm at the CO analyzer. 
The cause of the leakage and resulting measurement 
error was known, however, and could be avoided in 
future installations. As noted earlier, the leakage occurred 
at faulty junctions in the tube bundle. These could be 
minimized or eliminated by employing higher quality 
tubing and by utilizing a continuous length of tube bundle 
to reduce the number of tube bundle interconnections. 
Though elimination of leakage would be the preferred 
course, an accurate determination of gas concentration 
would be possible by appropriate adjustment of the sys-
tem's control software. Using a calibration gas of known 
concentration, the user would measure the level of dilution 
for a given tube and insert a ratio multiplier correction 
factor within the control software to adjust the analyzer 
output for that tube. 
Finally, depending on the application, accurate mea-
surement of gas concentrations may not be essential. In 
certain cases, the trend of a contaminant level over time 
or the rate of change of the contaminant level may be a 
sufficient indicator of a potentially dangerous heating event 
or fire. 
Parts listings, detailed assembly instructions, and a listing 
of the system control software program (written in BASIC 
programming language) are available upon request to the 
authors at Twin Cities Research Center. 
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